The invisible threat. Behind Europe’s sudden blackout.

On April 28, 2025, a massive and sudden blackout swept across the Iberian Peninsula, affecting Spain, Portugal, and parts of southern France. In just a few seconds, more than 15 gigawatts of electricity vanished from Spain’s grid, equivalent to 60% of its national demand, leaving millions without power, internet, mobile service, or transportation.

The official explanation, issued by regional grid operators, pointed to a rare form of “atmospheric interference”, a vague term referring to upper-atmosphere oscillations that disrupted synchronization in high-voltage transmission lines. Solar output reportedly collapsed from 18 gigawatts to 8 gigawatts within five minutes. Rail networks halted. Elevators froze mid-floor. Emergency generators kicked in at hospitals. It was a moment of chaos that rippled across national borders. But was this truly a natural phenomenon? Or are we witnessing, for the first time in modern European history, an unacknowledged act of electromagnetic sabotage?

A plausible but unconfirmed threat

So far, no government has claimed that foul play was involved. However, certain technical features of the blackout have raised questions among those familiar with electromagnetic warfare and critical infrastructure security. The sheer speed and regional scale of the outage suggest a disruption more sudden and synchronized than most naturally occurring events. The language used to describe the cause, "atmospheric oscillation", is not standard terminology in grid operations and resembles language that can, at times, be used to obscure politically sensitive causes. Furthermore, the simultaneous collapse in renewable energy output alongside grid instability resembles scenarios long feared by military planners, particularly those involving low-inertia energy systems.

Understanding electromagnetic sabotage

Electromagnetic sabotage can take several forms. One such method is an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), caused by the detonation of a nuclear device at high altitude. This type of attack can disable electronic systems over hundreds or even thousands of kilometers. A more localized threat is the non-nuclear EMP (NNEMP), a portable or vehicle-mounted device that can emit a powerful pulse within a specific area. Then there are high-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, which use directed energy to disable substations, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, and other critical infrastructure. While these technologies have not yet been deployed in open warfare, they have been extensively simulated by NATO, the U.S. Department of Defense, and other national security agencies. In contrast, most European power infrastructure remains largely unshielded against these threats, particularly at the level of transformers, substations, and control centers.

Europe’s grid: a fragile backbone

The European power grid is becoming increasingly vulnerable for several reasons. First, the continent’s shift toward renewable energy, especially in countries like Spain where solar power now comprises nearly 60% of the energy mix, has significantly reduced the system’s physical inertia. This makes the grid more sensitive to sudden disturbances. Second, the vast majority of Europe’s grid infrastructure, especially critical substations and control systems, has not been shielded against electromagnetic interference. These components remain exposed to both natural and artificial disruptions. Third, the structure of Europe’s electricity market itself creates systemic risk. The grid is highly interconnected across national borders. A disruption in one country can rapidly propagate through the entire network, as we saw in the April 28 blackout. Finally, SCADA systems, which manage the routing and load balancing of power, often lack redundancy and remain susceptible to both cyberattacks and electromagnetic disruption.

Natural or man-made?

It is important to be clear: there is no direct or public evidence that the April 28 blackout was caused by an attack. The official explanation involving a natural atmospheric disturbance may well be accurate. That said, from a strategic standpoint, the characteristics of the event align with the intended effects of electromagnetic weapons. Moreover, any actor wishing to test vulnerabilities or trigger a grid collapse without attribution might see value in engineering such an event to resemble a natural anomaly.

A call for preparedness

Regardless of the actual cause, the Iberian blackout should prompt European authorities to urgently reassess their preparedness for electromagnetic threats. This means conducting vulnerability audits across national grids, especially focusing on electromagnetic shielding of substations, transformers, and control systems. Grid operators and regulators should also invest in better detection systems for electromagnetic anomalies and expand crisis simulation exercises to include electromagnetic and blended cyber-electromagnetic scenarios. Additionally, the design of future energy infrastructure must account not only for decarbonization goals but for resilience against physical sabotage. In today’s digitized and interconnected world, electricity is no longer just a utility, it is a critical national asset and, increasingly, a strategic target. Whether the April 2025 blackout was the result of natural causes or something more sinister, it revealed just how fragile our power systems have become.